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Butler and Life: Law, Sovereignty, Power 
Elena Loizidou 
 
‘Life’ is a consistent theme in Butler’s work. In Subjects of Desire (1999b) she offers a 
reading of desire that is inextricably linked to life. In Gender Trouble (1990) life takes the 
form of gendered life, as in Bodies that Matter (1993) and Undoing Gender (2004b). 
Excitable Speech (1997) reflects upon injuries inflicted on lives by speech acts. In more 
recent work, Antigone’s Claim (2000a), Giving an Account of Oneself (2003; 2005) and 
Precarious life (2004a) she complicates claims made upon life by the ethical, political and 
legal sphere and unveils their discursive and material limitations. Nevertheless, despite the 
attachment to the concept of ‘life’, Butler makes no ontological claims regarding ‘life’ but 
rather articulates the practices involved in draining, restraining, or even destroying ‘life’. And 
she analyses the possible ways in which we may resist restrictions imposed upon us by state 
apparatuses (such as governmental officials and legislative limitations), disciplinary regimes, 
and norms – all so as to make possible livable lives.  
As is well known, Butler is suspicious of the juridical order and its ability to create 
better life conditions for subjects. Thus, some readers may be surprised to read, in Precarious 
Life, Butler’s call for a robust juridical intervention to curb the growing executive powers 
exercised by the Bush administration. However, as I explain below, Butler’s polemical 
approach there proves consistent with her overreaching philosophical thesis. That is, Butler’s 
concern for how we may create better conditions for life entails an agonistic relationship 
between the various spheres of life, and this, in turn, requires the law. Thus, the demand for a 
more robust law in Precarious Life gestures towards the creation of vital conditions that may 
not only ensure survival but also reinvigorate the conditions for what Butler calls ‘a livable 
life’.  
When the US government issued a de facto state of emergency after the 11 
September 2001 (‘9/11’) attacks in New York, Butler suggests that a new, synthetic 
modality of power emerged. The ‘decree’ (neither a piece of legislation nor an 
executive order, but a disciplinary and discursive production) not only suspended the 
laws but also did away with the separation of powers considered to be the pillars of the 
US constitution. The essay explains how this disciplinary production was managed, 
how it is still sustained, and what its effects are. Ultimately, I argue that these effects 
are produced through the re-emergence of a new type of sovereignty – one that uses 
governmentality as technique.1  
Governmentality and Law 
Governmentality, Foucault writes, is a practice of government emerging in the 16th 
century but reaching its apex in the 18th century (2002a: 212). While sovereignty had as its 
end the preservation of the sovereign and its territoriality, governmentality’s end is the 
management of populations. Foucault links its emergence with the coming into being of an 
administrative apparatus, the police, mercantilism and statistics. Foucault’s reception of the 
concept of government comes from La Perrière’s Miroir Politique and is defined ‘as a right 
manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good, as the jurists’ 
text would have said, but to an end that is “convenient” for each of the things that are 
governed’ (2002a: 212). A good governor, who above everything has to be patient (unlike the 
sovereign), will use tactics (even laws as tactics) to secure maximum security for their own 
population. This modality of power, as Foucault suggests, allows the state to survive (2002a: 
221). 
While Foucault provides us with a chronological understanding of the emergence of 
sovereign and governmental power, Butler, following Agamben, reminds us that both 
sovereign power and governmentality are contemporary forms. Further, she shows that they 
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hold an inverse relation to the rule of law (Butler 2004a: 60).2 For just this reason, it proves 
highly significant, when, just two pages into ‘Indefinite detention’, Butler proposes the 
following regarding the US treatment of detainees in Cuba and the use of power:  
‘I would like to suggest that the current configuration of power, in relation both to the 
management of populations (the hallmark of governmentality) and the exercise of 
sovereignty in the acts that suspend and limit the jurisdiction of law itself, are 
reconfigured in terms of the new war prison’ (Butler 2004a: 53). 
From the very start of the well-known essay, first published as a newspaper editorial, Butler 
separates modalities of power and law. Governmentality and sovereignty are read from the 
start as forces that act upon jurisdiction, the ‘territory’3 of law. At first blush, the proposition 
(and its consequences) creates an aporia, at least to those who are familiar with Foucault’s 
modalities of power, the very modalities that Butler is invoking in this essay. In Discipline 
and Punish (1991a), Foucault hardly differentiates between the sovereign and the law: both 
fall under the category of juridical power. Nevertheless, I want to emphasise that Foucault 
does not equate the sovereign with the law; rather, he vests the sovereign with the ‘force of 
law’. Foucault recognises that there is a jurisdiction that is legal. This jurisdiction, through 
the instrument of the trial, decides upon the ‘truth’ of the alleged event, and through the 
instrument of punishment, publicises the ‘truth’. In this context, Foucault writes, ‘[t]he body, 
several times tortured, provides the synthesis of the reality of the deeds and the truth of the 
investigation, of the documents of the case and the statements of the criminal, of the crime 
and the punishment’ (1991a: 47). For Foucault, the juridical order entertains itself with the 
trying of the accused (1991a: 44-8), but the king or prince, engages in a distinct practices 
with distinct effects. In the sovereign is vested the power of deciding life or death 
Therefore the sovereign’s power falls under the name ‘force of law’. This power, as 
Foucault explains, is a power of vengeance:  
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Besides its immediate victim, the crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him 
personally, since the law represents the will of the sovereign; it attacks him 
physically since the force of law is the force of the prince … The intervention of 
the sovereign is not, therefore, an arbitration between two adversaries; it is much 
more, even, than an action to enforce the respect of the rights of the individual; it 
is a direct reply to the person who has offended him (Foucault 1991a: 47-8). 
This passage makes clear that under the juridical model of power, the law is the instrument of 
the will of the sovereign. And Foucault sustains this position in Society Must be Defended 
where he shows that the juridical system serves the demands of, and benefits, royal power 
(2003: 25). Moreover, he explains that even when the juridical system concerns itself with the 
limits of sovereign power it never ceased to be about royal power. Nevertheless, this 
proximity between the juridical order and the sovereign cannot allow us to conclude that the 
sovereign is the law. In establishing a juridical order precisely for the exercise of his power, 
the king demonstrates that his interests reside in preserving himself and his territory. The 
interests of the juridical order itself thus include the preservation of sovereign power. The 
telos of the juridical order, on the other hand, lies in the production of ‘truth’ (no matter how 
fictitious this might be). However, and most importantly, when the sovereign decides over the 
life or death of subjects, what is being reproduced is not the truth but the sovereign’s will, i.e. 
power backed by the ‘force of law’. It is this distinction between the juridical order’s 
production of truth and the sovereign’s expression of force and will through that order, which 
informs Butler’s analysis of the contemporary political situation in the USA.  
New Modalities of Power 
Sorting out the relation between sovereignty, law, disciplinary power, and 
governmentality proves to be a highly fraught, yet extremely worthwhile endeavour: fraught 
because no one seems to map the relations in quite the same way; worthwhile since the stakes 
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of such mapping prove very high indeed. Agamben, Foucault, and Butler all provide essential 
contributions to this effort to grasp the relation of these modalities of power, but each comes 
at the problematic from a distinct angle, and sometimes those angles are irreconcilable with 
each other. Nevertheless, as much as the overlaps in their accounts help to clarify the 
concepts under discussion, the differences in those accounts show how high the political 
stakes may be. 
Agamben suggests that sovereign and governmental powers’ antithetical relation to 
the rule of law emerges at the moment when the norm is suspended, or when the law is 
withdrawn. Law, as Butler explains, ‘… withdraws from the usual domain of its jurisdiction; 
this domain becomes opened to both governmentality (understood as an extra-legal field of 
policy, discourse, that may make law into a tactic) and sovereignty (understood as an extra-
legal authority that may well institute and enforce law of its own making)’ (2004a: 60). For 
his part, Foucault also describes the withdrawal or ineffectiveness of law when new powers 
emerge. Disciplinary power, he says, often operates with the human sciences rather than law 
as its reference point (2003). Foucault thereby confirms that normalisation is not intrinsic to 
law, but rather to concrete disciplinary practices like policing, schooling, psychoanalysis and 
psychiatry, etc. From Foucault’s (or Butler’s) perspective we might say that Agamben 
conflates the norm with the law and effectively makes the law the epitome of normalisation.  
Butler, however, uses Agamben’s exposition of contemporary modalities of power to 
provide us with an analysis of power relevant to our current context. She builds upon 
Agamben’s understanding to propose her own version of sovereignty. Sovereignty, she 
writes:   
‘[is]… produced at the moment of this withdrawal, [therefore, we must] consider the act 
of suspending the law as a performative one which brings a contemporary configuration 
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of sovereignty into being, or more precisely, reanimates a spectral sovereignty within 
the field of governmentality’ (2004a: 61).  
This is a distinct and powerful (if not unproblematic) understanding of sovereignty. Agamben 
has proposed that the sovereign declarative utterance of a state of emergency activates the 
suspension of the law and constitutes the new modality of sovereign governmentality. This 
proposition implies that the sovereign pre-exists the utterance. And it may imply that 
Agamben himself knows who the sovereign is (e.g. the President of the United States, the 
Roman Emperor, etc.). For Butler, on the other hand, it is precisely the utterance of the state 
of emergency, or extraordinary conditions, that forms this sovereign governmentality. In 
other words, there is no sovereign before the declaration. The declaration brings about the 
sovereign power. Her reading refuses any naturalisation of power, in the sense that there 
would be an originary holder of such power. And her interpretation resists any foundationalist 
account of power, even if she proposes, as we shall see, that this type of power has the 
characteristics of a totalitarian regime.  
Thus, one might say that Butler holds to the general ‘structure’ of power proposed by 
Foucault – power as multifaceted dynamic, shifting relations. Her account creates multiple 
sites for sovereign governmentality and, simultaneously, creates multiple sites for resistance. 
Butler proposes that the withdrawal from law shares the characteristics of a performative act, 
in the sense that it brings into being what we would normally take to be already there, but at 
the same time it transplants this modality of power onto governmental practices (e.g. the 
management of detainees, the decisions of military tribunals, etc). These governmental 
practices that would otherwise have been part of some legal apparatus – such as prison codes 
of practice or laws of evidence – now act as ‘sovereign’ satellites without any legal 
foundation. Moreover, these very practices become endowed with the ‘sovereign’ power to 
make decisions over the right to life or death of these detainees (2004a: 94-5). 
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Governmentality, generally associated with the practice of managing populations, becomes 
revitalised as new modality of power that takes on the very ‘rights’ previously reserved for 
the sovereign. 
Performativity and the Dangerous Detainee 
This new coalition between governmental and sovereign power, as Butler suggests 
earlier in the same essay, has as its aim the augmentation and proliferation of state power 
(2004a: 58). This is achieved in two ways: firstly, by establishing military tribunals, whereby 
trials can come to ‘independent’ conclusions that nevertheless can be reversed by the 
executive; and secondly, by detaining the prisoners in Guantánamo Bay indefinitely. As the 
essay covertly suggests, there is a clear interrelation between the two practices: each of them 
presupposed the other for its successful operation. More explicitly, they are both produced 
performatively.  
Butler argues that this new form of sovereign power comes into being at the moment 
when it withdraws the applicability of law. The withdrawal correlates to the performative act 
that brings this new type of power into being and inaugurates a series of performative speech 
acts not founded in law but justified by the ‘force of law’. In relation to the establishment of 
military tribunals, Butler explains the operation of performative speech acts by citing an 
example. She analyses the justification provided by a Department of Defence (DOD) 
representative when asked by a reporter why the DOD did not use the already existing 
military courts to try the detainees. The DOD representative justifies the establishment of 
these tribunals by saying that the circumstances needed another ‘instrument’ (2004a: 83). As 
Butler writes, ‘the law is not that to which the state is subject nor that which distinguishes 
between lawful state action and unlawful, but is now expressly understood as an instrument, 
an instrumentality of power, one that can be applied and suspended at will’ (2004a: 83). 
Thus, the utterance itself, the DOD representative’s response, brings into being the 
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coincidence of these two models of power. Law is withdrawn, due to the ‘special 
circumstances; that the state finds itself in, replaced by sovereign power that uses law as a 
technique of governmentality. Withdrawal of law achieves the best management of the 
detainees. Moreover, by delegating the power to decide over the future of the detainees to a 
tribunal, power is transferred to the President to decide on the life of these detainees. While 
the tribunal can decide whether it could apply the death penalty, for example, the President 
has the power to decide whether or not to overrule their decisions. Butler’s essay also tracks 
the response to journalists’ questions put to William Haynes (DOD General Counsel). What 
would happen to the detainees if the military tribunal found them not guilty? Haynes’s reply: 
even under these conditions, detainees would not be released unless the state was satisfied 
that they were not dangerous (2004a: 74-5). Once more we witness a speech act that suspends 
the law. The place of law is taken up by sovereign power that could at any point withdraw its 
applicability for the so-called better protection of US citizens. At the moment of legal 
withdrawal we can see the efficacy of sovereign power and governmentality.  
Haynes’s statement is also telling in other ways since, as Butler observes, the 
detainees are not considered by the US administration to be common criminals but something 
more – dangerous individuals.4 The alleged ‘dangerousness of the detainees’ – cited as 
reason for the withdrawal of the rule of law – is also integral to a series of answers given by 
Donald Rumsfeld regarding indefinite detention. When asked why the US administration was 
holding these detainees indefinitely, Rumsfeld answered that if they were not restrained they 
would kill (2004a: 73). Rumsfeld uses clear ends-justify-means logic here, but he also 
contends that such means have a legal foundation. Rumsfeld suggests that the US 
administration is acting within the parameters of international and national law, even citing 
the example of Britain and the case in which ‘European human rights courts … allowed the 
British authorities to detain Irish Catholic and Protestant militants for long periods of time, if 
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they “were deemed dangerous, but not necessarily convicted of a crime”’ (2004a: 71). And in 
relation to domestic legislation, the US administration cites the restraining and hospitalisation 
of mentally ill people that takes place without the invocation of a criminal charge (2004a: 
73). In both cases, while one sees the detainees linked to the category of ‘the dangerous 
individual’ between one see little explanation or justification of this categorisation.  
The invocation of the ‘dangerous individual’ allows the state once more to use law as 
a technique of sovereign power. This tactic further suspends the norm of the rule of law, but 
at the same time it transforms the exception to the norm into the norm itself (2004a: 67). As 
Butler suggests, the performative speech acts justifies both the indefinite detention of the 
detainees while it simultaneously sustains, and renders coherent, the constitution of special 
military tribunals. The invocation of danger and the dangerous individual creates a space 
from which extra-legal power can be exercised indefinitely. According to Butler, the release 
of images of the detainees, both through television and photographs, aims to strengthen the 
effect of this performative act: ‘there is a reduction of these human beings to animal status, 
where the animal is figured as out of control, in need of total restraint’ (2004a: 78). 
If we consider in their totality the effects of this series of performative acts, we can 
clearly see that they reduce the detainees to bare life, to subjects that are outside ‘bios 
politicos’ (2004a: 67-8). Butler agrees with Agamben on this point, but she does not hesitate 
to problematise this conclusion. Agamben does not explain why only certain citizens are 
reduced to bare life (2004a: 67-8). In her attempt to grasp the problem of who or what counts 
as ‘bare life’, Butler turns to the equivalence that the US administration draws between the 
Guantánamo Bay detainees, on the one hand, and the mentally ill (as dangerous individuals) 
on the other. ‘Bare life’ includes those who are dead but not sacrificed; it captures a category 
of human being not equated with danger, animality, incivility and madness. Thus, one sees a 
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certain type of life, one deemed unlivable and unviable, read as a threat to those lives that are 
worth something.5  
Livable Lives 
Butler’s central concern lies with the very possibility of a livable life. Butler indicates 
that this new form of power (sovereign-governmentality) produces unlivable and unviable 
lives, and she thereby forces us to think about whether it is possible, given the conditions that 
govern us, to produce livable and viable lives. Would law be such a space? Throughout the 
essay Butler appears to want the detainees to be put through the process of a proper trial, 
within the parameters of the rules of evidence, but towards the end she clarifies her account 
and contends that she is not interested in merely upholding the rule of law. We can interpret 
this to mean that she is not interested in rule-based trials if rule-based trials will be in the 
hands of sovereign-governmentality. We might say that in Butler’s case a rule-based trial will 
still produce the unbearable effects for detainees if the rules and the practice of trying them 
remain instruments of governmental sovereignty. Nevertheless, she is curious to see whether 
law can have a ‘… place … in the articulation of an international conception of rights and 
obligations that limit and conditions claims of state sovereignty’ (2004a: 98).  
Butler clearly recognises the limitations of international law; the Geneva 
Conventions, for example, only provide protection for the states that are signatories to it 
(2004a: 86). States described as ‘rogue’, displaced stateless people, and citizens of emerging 
states – none of these can be protected by the convention. In and of itself, the law cannot 
provide sufficient conditions for a livable and viable life. Still, throughout the essay, she 
stubbornly and consistently calls for the detainees to be tried through the criminal or military 
courts. Why does she do so? If we are to understand her paradoxical position, we must look 
not only to this essay but to her other work where she either explicitly or inexplicitly invokes 
the law. If we are to give a more meaningful understanding to her call to put detainees on trial 
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than merely saying that Butler is a left liberal who upholds a faith in law, we need to grasp 
more fully the architecture of her thought.  
To do so, I suggest a return to Excitable Speech (1997), a place where Butler writes 
explicitly that the subject comes into being through language. We are named at birth. This is 
a type of proto-violence, since a subject’s ability to answer to that given name, may enable 
rather than avert future violence. At the moment of responding to our name, we gain a certain 
agency, but we also come under the force of an undeniable power. This process of agency 
and injury goes on throughout one’s life; life itself depends upon this endless process of 
‘speaking back’.6 Excitable Speech invokes the possibility of creating vitality through the 
modality of agonism – a sort of warring with the conditions that bring us into being.  
In significant and subtle ways, this agonism resembles the process of the trial. 
Butler’s invocation of the trial7 in ‘Indefinite detention’ might thereby be read as a call to 
sustain this agonistic spirit, to sustain it through the law. If law’s central characteristic is 
agonism then law may itself cultivate the conditions under which a livable life becomes 
possible. Thinking the law in this way makes it powerfully clear why Butler would insist on a 
trial for the detainees: it is only in the first place through the law that they might struggle for 
the conditions for a bearable, livable life. Unlike Agamben, who thinks that law has no 
connection with the production of life, Butler can see the role that law can play in this 
production. At the same time, like Agamben, she is aware that for this production to come 
about we need to transform the conditions of political action, so as to reconsider what it 
means to be human. Human rights, she argues, have failed so far to wrestle with the meaning 
of the human. The trial as a model creates the space for such consideration to take place. 
Nonetheless, the meaning of ‘human’ will remain open, contested:  
‘[t]o be human implies many things, one of which is that we are the kinds of beings 
who must live in a world where clashes of value do and will occur, and these clashes 
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are a sign of what a human community is. How we handle those conflicts will also be a 
sign of our humanness, one that is, importantly, in the making’ (2004a: 89).  
Butler not only emphasises the concept of humanness but also, and more importantly she 
focuses on the way we negotiate conflicting understandings of the human. It is precisely our 
handling of such an issue that will (or will not) produce our humanness. Butler, as I am 
reading her here, makes a powerful suggestion: that law can have a meaningful and important 
role to play in this process. Of course, negotiations with the human must transpire in many 
other spheres as well, and the political domain will be central to this endeavour.  
Butler wonders what type of power would be able to limit, alter, or utterly transform 
the dehumanising effects of the current status quo (2004a: 98–9). Indeed, what type of power 
could provide such an opening? If our lives are totalised by a sovereign power that uses 
governmentality as its strategy for re-territorialising itself, then what type of power can put a 
stop to the production of this death machine? If law is impotent because it cannot allow 
subjects to answer back, then what type of power could reverse this decay? In response to 
questions such as these, Agamben calls for pure violence, in the spirit of Benjamin. 
Reflecting upon both ‘Indefinite detention’ and Butler’s broader body of work leads to me the 
conclusion that she would consistently refuse to invoke the modality of pure violence. 
Indeed, in recent public lectures Butler has stated that she is searching for possible answers 
within philosophies of peace (2004c) and that she is committed to a type of violence that does 
not kill (2004d). Butler gives violence new requirements: not to kill but rather to revitalise 
life. I explain below that this search returns her to a combination of disciplinary and 
governmental power, whereby the very materiality of bodies and the conditions that they find 
themselves in can be re-addressed through practices of resistance.  
Disciplinary Power and Resistance Through the Law  
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In Discipline and Punish (1991a [1977]) and History of Sexuality, vol. 1 (1990 
[1978]), Foucault explains how the subject is produced through disciplinary power. For 
Foucault, disciplinary power is a different type of law, an infra-law: a type of law that is 
ahead of the juridical, that permeates the social, cultural and political body, and produces 
subjects precisely through the exercise of a series of disciplinary practices, including those of 
surveillance. As Brown and Hartley (2002: 11) remind us, disciplinary power does not lie 
with the state but rather with culture and society. To this extent Foucault imagines disciplines 
fighting against the juridical order (Foucault, 1991a: 222). This argument promotes an 
understanding of the norm, engendered by a series of practices, as located not within the law 
but rather within the social and cultural body – a part of its various institutions and discursive 
practices. The law is no longer perceived as the sole producer of the norm.  
In Gender Trouble, Butler uses disciplinary power to offer an understanding of how 
certain genders become intelligible, and how others are foreclosed from the visible spectrum. 
Intelligible genders are the ones that can maintain a certain stability and continuity between 
gender, sexuality, sex and desire (1990: 18). Any sexual practices or desires that derogate, 
destabilise and break the above unity are foreclosed. But Butler also shows that there is no 
ground lying behind these practices that would somehow ‘pronounce’ certain genders to be 
intelligible (or not). Rather it is the practices themselves, and the norms that they both 
(re)constitute and instantiate that produces intelligibility as such. The idea of gender 
performativity serves to reveal these practices as constitutive of gender norms. Butler argues 
that the practice of gendering proves always to be a performative practice. At the same time 
these practice enable the very agency of the always gendered subject to become agentic. And 
this agency makes possible a certain resistance to the very norm that formed it. Resistance 
emerges as a critical genealogy (1990: 5), one that is embedded in legitimising practices but 
not confined to them.  
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Therefore, Butler can be said to use disciplinary power as a weapon for challenging 
juridical law, in the sense of encountering and countering law’s claim to universality and 
demonstrating that its very existence relies on those foreclosures that it brings about. 
Disciplinary power is also used to show that the normative does not always coincide with the 
law; the normative is not the law. This means precisely that norms are not static; they can be 
transformed by the subjects that are to be formed by them. To be called a woman, for 
example, relies on a cultural understanding of what a woman ‘is’ that, in turn, is based on the 
differentiation between man and woman. But when a woman becomes a man through 
reassignment, for example, we can see that the trans-sexual person both destabilises the 
normative understanding of what ‘is’ a woman (gender, sexuality, sex and desire), unconceals 
the very phantasmatic grounds of the norm, and simultaneously shows that norms are not 
static.8  
Similarly, when a young man runs away from the police who are shouting at him, he 
resists the interpellative call that somehow names him as a criminal. His running away 
enables us to see that the normative understanding of who is a criminal is based precisely on 
discursive practices that produce the category of ‘the criminal’. So, to put it another way, 
disciplinary practices, as Foucault would have it, create counter-disciplines that produce 
different narratives of the normative, and this different narratives my allow for the subject’s 
survival. This was not -the case with Jean-Charles Menezes, who was mistakenly shot by the 
Metropolitan Police in London, but our survivability as citizens of or visitors to the UK relies 
precisely on possibilities opening up, no matter how minimal they may be, that can allow us 
to undo normative hegemony. Consider for example, Butler’s own understanding of the norm 
from ‘Competing universalities’:  
[n]orms are not only embodied, as Bourdieu has argued, but embodiment is itself 
a mode of interpretation, not always conscious, which subjects normativity to an 
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iterable temporality. Norms are not static entities, but incorporated and 
interpreted features of existence that are sustained by the idealizations furnished 
by fantasy (Butler, 2000b: 152). 
The re-interpretation of the norm, through resistance to it, creates the conditions for one’s 
survivability. Moreover, such resistance reconfigures the plateau of intelligibility. In 
Excitable Speech, Butler calls for the avoidance of any form of censorship that could do away 
with the constant reconfiguration and survival of subjects, even if and when their 
interpellation into being is an injurious one.  
At the heart of Butler’s understanding of how we can sustain livable lives lies the 
structure of agonism. When norms do not become the law – when, in other words, the state 
and the sovereign do not totalise the sphere of intelligibility, either by using the law as a 
governmental instrument or by using disciplinary practices like surveillance to govern every 
aspect of our lives – then we can resist the cultural norms that bring us into being. Moreover, 
if we engage with this struggle then we may attain something more than our survival, our 
viability.  
However, and this is I think what explains Butler’s recent quest for a different role for 
the juridical law, when the law and norms become one then the possibility for survival as 
humans becomes delimited. That is, when President George W. Bush presents the law and 
norms as unitary then only a very small space for resistance remains, since every form of 
dissent is rendered not only unintelligible but also dangerous, a threat to national security and 
cohesion. Under these conditions, law becomes for Butler the only vehicle for resistance, and, 
specifically, through the practice of the trial, the only force for dissent. Crucially, in order for 
law to become such a force for resistance it must, as Benjamin and Agamben suggest, do 
away with its interest in its own preservation. How could this become possible? As Butler 
suggests in ‘Competing universalities’, borrowing from Spivak’s work,9 the practice of 
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translation may enable the agonism between competing universalities, competing concepts of 
the human. Such a practice will entail working with precisely the differences between 
competing notions without reducing the one into the other. Law perhaps can take up the task 
of the translator. But, nevertheless, the task of the translator necessitates, despite any logical 
incompatibilities between competing universalities, that there might be some common 
grounds for ‘social and political aims’ (2000b: 167). So perhaps the law could become that 
space whereby the illogical incompatibilities – or at least the illogical incompatibilities 
between those that are said to perpetuate the global terrorism and those that fight it – could 
meet. And perhaps a translation of what it is to be human, without the confinements of 
justice, the ends of law, can become the means for such discussion, if human survival and 
vitality can still be entertained. For, as Butler writes, life is precarious (some lives more than 
others), always an ambivalent concept, but as things now stand it risks losing its ambivalence 
if we continue to support the sovereign’s contention that what it is to be human, and what life 
means are neutral terms.  
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1 This position still holds true today, even after the cases heard by the Supreme Court of the 
US relating to grant of a writ of habeas corpus to certain detainees in Guantánamo Bay; see 
Motha (2005). 
2 It is also important to note that Foucault is relatively clear in Society Must be Defended that 
neither sovereign power nor disciplinary power disappears once governmental power 
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emerges; rather, ‘society’ is permeated by this new form of power called governmentality 
(Foucault 2003: 241). 
3 ‘Territory’ designates not only spatial boundaries, but also the custodian status of a 
detainee. For more in relation to a case of detainees in Guantánamo Bay and their habeas 
corpus challenges brought before the Supreme Court of the US, see Motha (2005). 
4 Her observation invokes subtly Foucault’s essay ‘About the Concept of the “Dangerous 
Individual” in Nineteenth-century Legal Psychiatry’ (Foucault 2002b: 176-200). In this essay 
Foucault writes of the institutionalisation of individuals who committed motiveless crimes. 
The dangerous individual, who was in some respects insane, was the one whose crime was 
without motive or reason. The dangerous individual was to be assessed via the concept of 
risk. When an individual cannot account for, or take responsibility for, their act, judicial 
practice is rendered impotent.  
5 However, when Butler problematises the correspondence of terrorist detainees with 
the mad she appears – unintentionally, I would suppose – to suggest that the mad are totally 
unintelligible, dangerous, etc. That is, she implies that the equivalence or correspondence of 
mad—terrorist is truly catachrestic. This move runs the risk of presenting the insane as 
unintelligible, unmotivated and uncivilised. Foucault, of course, alerted readers to the 
clinicians’ invention of insanity and, moreover, alerted us to precisely the construction of the 
insane as based on instrumentalisation. In Madness and Civilization (1991b) he suggests that 
the separation of madness from reason coincides with the birth of the profession of psychiatry 
and this specialised knowledge. The perception of insane acts as unintelligible, bereft of will 
and uncivilised is clearly a historical production, and Foucault’s historical accounting of this 
epistemic shift serves, in its own peculiar way, to render the category of ‘madness’ more 
intelligible. I have no intention here of dismissing Butler’s position, but rather I am 
suggesting that there are ways in which one could use this precise metonymic practice to the 
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advantage of those who are deemed ‘bare life’. We can, for example, challenge in its totality 
the construction of the dangerous individual and its various configurations that has permeated 
both the legal and the political discourse. 
6 All of this explains why the regulation of injurious language (hate speech, pornography, etc) 
may curtail the possibility for the subject to stay alive, to be recognised and recognisable 
(1997: 5). 
7 In State of Exception (2005), Agamben argues that in the case of juridical law, the concrete 
case always entails a ‘trial’ of which the end is to pronounce a sentence guaranteed by other 
institutions of the state (39-40). Amongst other things this observation suggests that the 
operability of law necessitates the practice of trial, otherwise we would clearly see the decay 
of law. 
8 I am by no means suggesting, nor is Butler herself, that this is an uncomplicated, nor that it 
can occur outside of processes and practices of surveillance. 
9 See Spivak (2003: 162) and Benjamin (2004: 253-63). 
 
 
